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ced objective of the rules. 61
The ruling in Stieler is sound in that it is consonant with- the well reasoned
judicial definition of "reasonable explanation" as set forth by the dissent in
Sloan. The significant relaxation of requirements for timely filing that
are reflected by the Stieler opinion and the Sloan dissent seem consistent with
the judicial policy which favors the disposition of appeals on their merits and
not by procedural dismissal. The judicial policy indicated by the majority
in Sloan, which maintains outmoded procedural burdens, should be regarded
as contrary both to the spirit of the 1976 amendments 62 and to the positive
and obligatory objective of the rules.6 8
David E. Chamberlain

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Due Process-Rights of Accused
Not Violated by Trial in Prison Clothing if No
Objection Is Made During Trial or
Pretrial Proceedings
Estelle v. Williams,
-U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976).
Henry Lee Williams was indicted for assault with intent to murder with
malice and was incarcerated for failure to post bond. Williams requested
his civilian clothing for trial, but his request was refused by prison officials.
The accused appeared at trial in clothing distinctively marked as prison issue,
but no objection was made to the trial judge by Williams or his attorney. The
jury returned a verdict of guilty.
On direct appeal the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed,' and on
subsequent habeas corpus petition, the federal district court denied relief on
61. TEx. R. Civ. P. 1 states:
The proper objective of the rules of civil procedure is to obtain a just, fair, equitable, and impartial adjudication of the rights of the litigants under established
principles of substantive law. To the end that this objective may be attained with
as great expedition and dispatch and at least expense both to litigants and to the
state as may be practicable, these rules shall be given a liberal construction.
62. Graves v. Dullnig, 538 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1976,
no writ) (per curiam).
63. TEx. R. Civ. P. 1.
1. Williams v. State, 477 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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grounds of harmless error. 2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the finding of harmless error and reversed, holding that prosecution of defendant before a jury in clothing identifiable as prison issue was
a fundamental denial of due process.8 On appeal to the Supreme Court the
government urged reinstatement of the conviction on grounds of waiver based
on the failure to object to the prison clothing. Held-Reversed. Although
clearly constitutional error to force an accused to appear at jury trial in
prison clothing, the failure to object to trial in such clothing, regardless of
the reason, is sufficient to negate the inference of compulsion necessary to
4
establish a constitutional violation of due process requirements.
The fourteenth amendment provides all persons the fundamental right to
a fair trial and guarantees every individual the presumption of innocence. 5
Criminal trials must be conducted in an atmosphere of fairness; guilt must
be established beyond a reasonable doubt solely on the basis of probative
evidence.
These guarantees are individual refinements of the aggregate
principle that no person shall be deprived "of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."' 7 Nonevidentiary factors introduced by the prosecution
at trial which might tend to influence jurors in the determination of guilt or
innocence of the accused are subject to close judicial scrutiny to prevent dilution of these fundamental protections. 8
Due process violations vary in prejudicial severity and do not require
reversal for a new trial in every case. A second trial is never awarded in
situations where the alleged error is "harmless." 9 Even where a due process
error is shown to exist, the judgment of the court below will be affirmed if
the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the error could not reasonably have
been a significant factor in obtaining conviction. 10 Harmless error statutes
or rules are in effect in all states and closely correspond to the federal standard that judgments will "not be reversed for errors or defects which do not
affect the substantial rights of the parties.""
2. Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335, 344 (S.D. Tex. 1973).

3. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
4. Estelle v. Williams, -

U.S.

-, -,

96 S. Ct. 1691, 1697, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126,

135 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-73 (1965); Coffin v.
United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).

6. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1965); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
135-36 (1955).

9.
States,
816-17
10.
11.

See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 757 (1946); Gay v. United
322 F.2d 208, 209 (10th Cir. 1963); Addison v. United States, 317 F.2d 808,
(5th Cir. 1963); Naval v. United States, 278 F.2d 611, 614 (9th Cir. 1960).
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
Id. at22.
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Reversal is also denied whenever the circumstances indicate the accused
12
has waived one or more of his guarantees under the fourteenth amendment.
Convoluted questions of legal presumption and factual circumstance appear
to have introduced uncertainty and disagreement in the waiver cases, but the
proper definition of waiver must clearly include situations of intentional relinquishment of known rights and procedural by-pass of legal options effectively
suspending the defendant's right to demand reversal on the basis of due
process error.'

3

In Johnson v. Zerbst14 the Supreme Court established guidelines for determining whether due process rights have been intentionally waived. The
accused must be shown to have engaged in conduct indicating "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."'" Procedural
by-pass was more difficult for the courts to adequately describe or define,
but was limited to situations where the convicted defendant deliberately chose
to forego the orderly procedures available in the state court in order to seek
release by federal habeas corpus. 16 Where the accused knowingly and deliberately, regardless of reason, failed to pursue adequate remedies available in
the state courts for vindication of federal rights, habeas corpus has been
routinely denied in -the federal courts. 17 This logic culminated in the landmark decision of Fay v. Noia,18 where the controlling standard for procedural
by-pass was established. Where the state processes for vindication of federal
rights suppressed at trial were deliberately by-passed on the considered choice
of both the accused and his counsel, relief by habeas corpus is ordinarily
denied.' 9
Habeas corpus petitions grounded on due process arguments should thus
be dismissed unless it affirmatively appears that constitutional error resulted
12. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see Barker v.Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 525-29 (1972); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 452 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 439 (1963). The term "waived" is used here without precise legal definition;
rather, it is meant to imply some action or inaction on the part of the defendant indicating an intent not to rely legally on the due process guarantee in issue.
13. Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963), with Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
14. 304U.S. 458 (1938).
15. Id. at 464; accord, Hatcher v. United States, 352 F.2d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (direct communication between accused and trial judge ordinarily necessary to
establish waiver of constitutional rights); United States ex rel. West v. LaVallee, 335
F.2d 230, 231 (2d Cir. 1964) (failure to object at trial to introduction of illegally seized
evidence does not give rise to inference of waiver); Naples v. United States, 307 F.2d
618, 625-26 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (knowing and intentional waiver of trial by jury).
16. See Lefkowitz v.Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 290 n.6 (1975); Moore v. Michigan,
355 U.S. 155, 162-65 (1957); Bates v. Dickson, 226 F. Supp. 983, 987 (N.D. Cal.
1964).
17. See, e.g., Key v. Holman, 346 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1965); Gravette v. Maxwell,
340 F.2d 95, 96 (6th Cir. 1965); Wampler v. Warden, 224 F. Supp. 37, 39 (D. Md.

1963).

18. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
19. Id. at 439-40.
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at trial, that such error was not harmless, and that the petitioner had not
waived his right to claim error by relinquishment or by-pass of due process
protections. 20 As these tests were applied in Williams, the Court felt that
appearance in clothing identifiable as prison issue has a negative impact on
the presumption of innocence since defendant's clothing is likely to introduce

impermissible considerations in the minds of the jurors. 21 This was in accord
22
with considerable previous authority.
The harmless error question, however, remained substantially unresolved
by the available precedent. Requiring the defendant to stand trial in prison
clothing was commonly considered a due process error, but reversal was
granted primarily in situations where actual prejudice had resulted or could
be strongly inferred. 23 For example, where the accused was on trial for an
offense allegedly committed while he was in prison, the appearance of
defendant in prison clothing was clearly harmless error since "no prejudice
' 24
can result from seeing that which is already known."
Despite the rather lengthy discussion of harmless error, Williams' conviction was ultimately upheld on grounds of waiver established by the failure
to object during trial. 25 'By guidelines established in Johnson, intentional
waiver must be demonstrated by some affirmative action of the defendant
communicating his desire not to invoke the due process protections afforded. 2
In this case there was no such communication by Williams or by his attorney.
Similarly, the procedural by-pass tests established in Fay were not met
because of the absence of any indication of intent and joint consideration by
Williams and counsel to by-pass the procedures available for vindication of
20. In the absence of other factors sufficient to deny federal relief, proof of prejudicial constitutional error, validly asserted, will entitle the petitioner to relief under habeas corpus. Gaito v. Brierly, 485 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel.
Lowery v. Murphy, 245 F.2d 751, 752 (2d Cir. 1957).
21.

Estelle v. Williams, -

U.S.

96 S. Ct. 1691, 1693, 1699, 48 L. Ed.

2d 126, 130-31, 139 (1976).
22. See, e.g., Gaito v. Brierly, 485 F.2d 86, 88 (3d Cir. 1973); Brooks v. Texas,
381 F.2d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 1967); Miller v. State, 457 S.W.2d 848, 849-50 (Ark. 1970).
23. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, - U.S. -, 96
S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126; Gaito v. Brierly, 485 F.2d 86, 88 (3d Cir. 1973); Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634, 636-37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971);
Hall v. Cox, 324 F. Supp. 786, 787 (W.D. Va. 1971); People v. Shaw, 164 N.W.2d
7, 10 (Mich. 1969).
24. United States ex rel. Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 556, 557 (5th Ciri.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 971 (1973); see Boswell v. State, 537 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1976)
(error was harmless where jury venire saw accused in prison clothing before jury was
selected); Wright v. Texas, 533 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1976) (error was harmless
where clothing was not typical of or identifiable as prison issue). Contra, People v.
Roman, 365 N.Y.S.2d 527, 528 (1975) (irrespective of where the offense occurs, the
accused has a right to trial in civilian clothing).
25. Estelle v. Williams, -

U.S.

-, -,

96 S. Ct. 1691, 1695-96, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126,

134-35 (1976).
26. Johnson v.Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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federal rights. 27 Waiver as used here must then depend upon other considerations independent of the tests established in Johnson and Fay.
Analysis of the Williams decision indicates the probable introduction of two
factors not considered in either Johnson or Fay. For purposes of intentional

waiver, the Court distinguished between fundamental constitutional rights on
one hand, and strategic and tactical decisions with constitutional implications on the other, holding the exacting standards of Johnson inapplicable in

the latter instance. 28 Where the accused obviously understands the issue
involved and is subjected to no prejudicial effect from entering an objection,
the defendant and his attorney have the burden of directing the attention of
the trial court to the error before the state may be held accountable for the
29
effects of trial in prison clothing.
As an independent consideration, the Court relegated showing of actual
prejudice or possibility of prejudice to a position of little importance in determining the issue of procedural by-pass and raised the question of state compulsion to controlling prominence.8 0 This is perhaps the most startling product of the majority decision, and the one which sparked the most vigorous
argument in the dissent. 3' The issue of state compulsion had been previously

discussed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but in other jurisdictions it was of primary importance only in self-incrimination problems involving the fifth amendment.8 2 At least for the majority of courts, the
27. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963). ,In Williams, defendant requested his civilian clothing from prison officials, at no time indicated a desire to be
tried in prison clothing, and was never questioned by the trial judge concerning his
attire. Estelle v. Williams, - U.S. -, -, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1692, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126,
129-30 (1976).
28. Estelle v. Williams, - U.S. , , 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1695 n.3, 48 L. Ed. 2d
126, 133 n.3 (1976), citing On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) and United
States v. Indiviglio, 352 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 907 (1966),
as examples of rights which may be considered waived by failure to object at trial.
29. Estelle v. Williams, -

U.S. -,

-,

96 S. Ct. 1691, 1696-97, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126,

134-35 (1976); see United States ex rel. Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 556, 557 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971 (1973) (offense committed while in prison confinement); Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 1971) (defendant, though he
did not object at trial, was deemed to have met his burden of directing attention of
trial court to due process error).
30. Estelle v. Williams,

-

U.S.

-,

-,

96 S. Ct. 1691, 1694-95, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126,

132-33 (1976) (judicial focus is on compelling defendant, against his will, to be tried
in jail attire). Derogation of the question of actual prejudice occurs by omission in
the Williams decision. In reaching its decision, the majority discussed prejudice in a
general review of harmless error, but never affirmatively considered whether this defendant was actually or probably prejudiced by wearing prison garments. See id. at -,
96 S. Ct. at 1694, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 132.
31. Id. at-, 96 S. Ct. at 1700, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 139-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. Bently v. Crist, 469 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1972); see Garner v. United States,
- U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 1178, 1182, 47 L. Ed. 2d 370, 374 (1976) (discussing compulsory
self-incrimination); Maness v. Mayers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975) (discussing state compulsion in fifth amendment problems); People v. Du Bose, 89 Cal. Rptr. 134, 137-38
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introduction of state compulsion into the field of due process was a significant
modification of existing law. 8 Preliminary consideration of the impact of
Williams would thus indicate that, as to due process questions which may
involve trial tactics, it is less important that prejudice has resulted than that
prejudice was compelled by the state. In securing the protection of the fourteenth amendment, a defendant must object to any possible errors where a
question of trial tactics might be involved, but may maintain absolute silence
84
if the error relates to a more fundamental right of due process.
Unfortunately, beyond the issue of prison marked clothing, the Supreme
Court made little attempt to distinguish those rights which are fundamentally
protected from those which are subsidiary and require objection at trial.8 5
This failure, with its ramifications of uncertainty in future trials and possibility of unfairness to the presentation of an adequate criminal defense, seemed
to bring the sharpest comment from the Williams dissent.8 6 No significant
definitional guidelines were provided for determination of future due process
errors. Absent objection at trial, Williams clearly requires a showing of state
compulsion in order to secure reversal of convictions where the accused was
tried in prison clothing; 7 it remains unclear, however, whether this should
be extended to other due process situations. Although Williams did not overrule the Johnson and Fay tests for intentional waiver and procedural by-pass,
the application of these decisions was limited to the protection of fundamental
due process rights beyond the privilege of appearing at trial in civilian
clothing. s8 Trial courts will thus be forced to interpret Williams to determine
other situations where waiver of due process rights may be found without
intentional relinquishment. The inherent difficulty in making a correct interpretation in the midst of trial could thus open the door to a complete rever(Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (reversal for due process error arising from trial in prison clothing requires showing that trial in such garments was compelled).
33. See Miller v. State, 457 S.W.2d 848, 849-50 (Ark. 1970). Even the limited
authority cited by the Williams majority indicates that a showing of actual prejudice
may be sufficient for reversal, even where the defendant did not object during trial.
See Thomas v. State, 451 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Wilkinson v. State,
423 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Xanthull v. State, 403 S.W.2d 807, 809
(Tex. Crim. App. 1966). The Williams dissent by Justice Brennan carried this argument still further to distinguish state compulsion from previous applications of the intentional waiver and procedural by-pass doctrines. See Estelle v. Williams, - U.S. -,
96 S. Ct. 1691, 1700-01, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 140-41 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
-,
34. An entirely different result may obtain, however, if the accused is acting without

the benefit of counsel at trial. There is a strong indication that under those circumstances, the rights of the accused will be more stringently protected. Estelle v. Williams,
-

U.S.

-,

35. Id.
36. Id.
senting).
37. Id.
38. Id.

-,

96 S. Ct. 1691, 1695 n.3, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 133 n.3 (1976).

at
at

-,

at
at

-,
-,

-,

96 S. Ct. at 1697, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 135.
96 S. Ct. at 1701 n.5, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 141 n.5 (Brennan, J., dis96 S. Ct. at 1697, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 135.
96 S. Ct. at 1695 n.3, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 133 n.3.
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sal of the intentional waiver and procedural by-pass doctrines3 9 Where a
trial judge has an inadequate standard on which to determine questions of
law, the possibility of error multiplies dramatically, and extension of the
Williams principles to require objection at trial in order to preserve any due
process error might subsequently present the most desirable solution.
Although Williams may auger sweeping changes in the procedural protection of the due process rights of a criminal defendant, these modifications
were not necessarily delineated. 40 New factors have, however, been introduced with insufficient guidance in application; it is difficult to determine the
extent. to which these factors will control in future criminal trials. 41 A clear
definition of the class of due process protections requiring objection at trial
to preserve the error would be a first and major step toward eliminating the
uncertainty of a defendant and his counsel. A second and more drastic step
would involve the complete reconsideration of the legitimacy of the Johnson
and Fay standards for waiver. Ultimately, this would be necessary to arrive at
an unobstructed view of the rationale behind all due process protections
presently in effect: the assurance of a fair trial and the presumption of innocence require that the defendant be protected from prejudicial trial circumstances unrelated to evidentiary and probative matters of guilt or innocence.
The question left unresolved by Williams is whether the courts will ensure
that the trial is fair or will place the burden on the shoulders of the accused
and his counsel.
PatrickStrong
39. Id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 1701 n.5, 48 L Ed. 2d at 141 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

40. Since Williams made no attempt to distinguish any particular class of cases re-

quiring objection at trial to preserve error, it is impossible to determine the extent to
which this holding may be extended beyond the narrow situation of trial in clothing
readily identifiable as prison issue.
41. Again, the Court expressed no opinion as to the class of cases where the possibility of trial tactics will bar a claim of due process error and effectively prohibit reversal on grounds of actual prejudice. See id. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 1701 n.5, 48 L. Ed.
2d at 141 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has subsequently indicated
that the issue of state compulsion may be extended into other areas of waiver, but established no boundaries on possible development. Frances v.Henderson, - U.S. -, 96
S. Ct. 1708, 48 L. Ed. 2d 149 (1976). In Henderson, failure to object to jury composition before trial began operated as a waiver of this right under subsequent habeas corpus
proceedings. Id. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 1710, 48 L. Ed. at 153.
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